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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 1988, Pan American Flight 103 left London's
Heathrow Airport bound for John F. Kennedy Airport in New
York.' The Boeing 747 exploded in midair over Lockerbie, Scot-
land, killing all 259 people aboard.' A terrorist organization had
defeated the Pan American security systems and planted the bomb
that caused the fatal explosion.-
The relatives and personal representatives of those who died
on Flight 103 sued Pan American World Airways, Inc. ("Pan Am")
and the two Pan Am subsidiaries that had provided the flight with
1. In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland, 733 F. Supp. 547, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1990),
afl'd, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
2. Id. at 549.
3. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267, 1269 (2d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
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security.4 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consoli-
dated the cases in the Eastern District of New York for coordi-
nated pretrial proceedings.'
The plaintiffs asserted state law wrongful death claims against
Pan Am seeking both compensatory and punitive damages for Pan
Am's alleged wilful misconduct.' Pan Am moved for partial sum-
mary judgment on all punitive damage claims on the grounds that
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to In-
ternational Transportation by Air7 ("Warsaw Convention") bars
punitive damages.8 For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the
district court assumed Pan Am had committed wilful misconduct
and that the applicable state law permitted punitive damages.,
The district judge granted the motion and dismissed plaintiffs'
claims for punitive damages.10
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the Warsaw
Convention does not provide the exclusive cause of action and that
damages should be determined in accordance with local law. The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding: (1)
the Warsaw Convention preempts state law causes of action where
4. Id.
5. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 709 F. Supp. 231, 232 (J.P.M.L. 1989).
Eighteen actions pending in four federal districts were consolidated in the Eastern District
of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, as all actions shared factual questions concerning
the cause or causes of the explosion of Flight 103. Id.
The appeal before the Second Circuit was actually the consolidated appeal of cases that
arose from two separate international flight disasters: the December 1988 explosion of Pan
Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland and the September 1986 hijacking of Pan Am
Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1269. The district courts in each of
the cases faced the same questions of law, but reached opposite conclusions. Id. Because
these issues are largely "independent of any factual situation," the circuit court of appeals
consolidated the cases for the purposes of this appeal. Id. Only the facts of the Lockerbie
disaster will be presented in this Note. For the facts of the Karachi hijacking, see In re
Hijacking of Pan American World Airways, Inc. Aircraft at Karachi Int'l Airport, Pakistan
on Sept. 5, 1986, 729 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
6. 733 F. Supp. at 549. "The majority of complaints assert[ed] diversity and not federal
question jurisdiction." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.
1991) (No. 91-259).
7. Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1936), reprinted in note following 49
U.S.C.A. § 1502 (West 1976) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. The parties conceded that
because Flight 103 involved international transportation, the actions were governed by the
Warsaw Convention. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1269.
8. 733 F. Supp. at 548.
9. 928 F.2d at 1269.
10. Id.
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the injury falls within the scope of the Convention; and (2) the
Warsaw Convention does not allow recovery of punitive damages.
In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
The Warsaw Convention is a multilateral treaty that governs
the liability of international air carriers.1" It has two primary goals.
The first is to limit the potential liability of international air carri-
ers in the event of accidents and lost or damaged cargo. 2 The sec-
ond is to establish uniform rules for governing claims arising out of
international transportation."3
In view of these goals, the Supreme Court of the United States
has interpreted Article 171" of the Warsaw Convention as declaring
the carrier liable "only when three conditions are satisfied: (1)
there has been an accident, in which (2) the passenger suffered
[death, wounding, or any other bodily injury], and (3) the accident
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of. . .embarking
or disembarking."'" These conditions are important because they
ensure uniformity in Warsaw Convention litigation by restricting
recovery to those cases where the conditions are satisfied.
11. Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 1. The Convention applies to "all interna-
tional transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire." Id.
12. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 256 (1984);
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW AFFECTING AIR QUESTIONS, MINUTES, SECOND INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw 13 (Rob-
ert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans., 1975) [hereinafter WARSAW MINUTES]; Andreas F.
Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967).
13. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 256; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 498.
See WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 85, 87.
14. The complete text of Article 17 is as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the air-
craft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 17.
15. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1494 (1991). The authentic text of
the treaty is in French, and thus must be interpreted. See Warsaw Convention, supra note
7, art. 36. The drafting parties to the Convention represented many different languages,
legal systems, and commercial practices. To promote the Convention's goal of uniformity,
they chose one language and one legal system with which to work, hoping to reduce the
divergences associated with drafting an agreement in multiple languages and systems. Al-
though no "official" English translation of the treaty exists, the United States Senate used
an unofficial translation when it ratified the Convention in 1934. See Floyd, 111 S. Ct. at
1493. The Supreme Court of the United States has characterized this text as "the official
American translation." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985). The "official American"
translation can be found in the note following 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (West 1976).
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This Note examines whether the Warsaw Convention
preempts state law claims when the injury alleged is one for which
the Convention also provides a cause of action. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that it does,'6 but other courts have reached
the contrary conclusion." This Note argues that allowing the War-
saw Convention to preempt state law causes of action gives the
treaty too narrow an application. The Convention's dual goals of
uniformity and limitation of air carriers' liability are best achieved
by allowing plaintiffs to bring a claim based either on the treaty or
on state law, while at the same time limiting recovery according to
the terms and conditions of the Warsaw Convention. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the language of the Convention, the
intentions of the signatory countries, and judicial precedent within
the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
A two-edged sword,' 8 the Warsaw Convention makes it easier
for injured parties to bring claims because the air carrier is pre-
sumed liable,' 9 but it limits damages by placing an absolute cap on
the amount plaintiffs may recover.2 0 When, however, plaintiffs
16. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1273.
17. See, e.g., In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 414 n.25
(9th Cir. 1983) (delegates did not intend the Convention's cause of action to be exclusive);
In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, 660 F. Supp. 1202, 1221 (W.D. Ky.
1987); Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 737, 740 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (Convention does
not provide exclusive cause of action, but does provide exclusive remedy); Alvarez v. Aer-
ovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 756 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (Convention
creates exclusive remedy, not exclusive cause of action); Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales de
Colombia, 738 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1990), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
929 F.2d 599 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 376 (1991) (may state cause of action
solely on state law theory); Perkin Elmer v. Trans Mediterranean Airways, S.A.L., 107
F.R.D. 55, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). But see Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 737 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186
(1985) (Convention creates the controlling cause of action); Velasquez v. Aerovias Nacion-
ales de Colombia, S.A., 747 F. Supp. 670, 675 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (Convention provides the
exclusive cause of action); In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833,
844-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983)
(Convention exclusively governs any and all claims).
18. See Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1263 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
19. Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 17. Article 17 creates a presumption that
relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving certain issues, such as negligence and causa-
tion. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1279.
20. The Warsaw Convention originally limited damages to 125,000 poincar6 francs
($8,300). Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 22. The United States became so dissatis-
fied with this low recovery limit that on November 15, 1965, it filed a formal notice of de-
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choose to bring their claims based on state law instead of the War-
saw Convention,21 the effect of the treaty is unclear.22 This confu-
sion is partially explained by the judicial treatment of the Conven-
tion. Originally, the courts interpreted the Convention as providing
no independent cause of action.2 3 Today, however, courts univer-
sally agree that it does provide a cause of action when certain con-
ditions are met.2 4 Whether a state law cause of action can coexist
with a cause of action under the Convention remains to be
clarified.
The Convention itself adds to the confusion because it does
not explicitly address what types of damages a party may recover
against an international air carrier;25 it simply places conditions2"
nunciation, to become effective six months thereafter. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
368 F. Supp 1152, 1154 (D.N.M. 1973). This and other dissatisfactions resulted in the Agree-
ment Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol
("Montreal Agreement"), whereby the international air carriers that serve the United States
agreed to raise the liability limit to $75,000 and waive the availability of the due care de-
fense of Article 20. See Agreement CAB 18,900, Order of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving
Ihcreases in Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, reprinted in
note following 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (West 1976); Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery for Emotional
Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning
of Lesion Corporelle, 25 TEx. INT'L L.J. 127, 131 (1990). The Montreal Agreement is not a
treaty, but rather a private accord by which the air carriers agree to a system of absolute
liability. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 39.2, 407 (1985); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 12, at 586-96.
As a result of the Montreal Agreement, the United States withdrew its notice of denun-
ciation on May 14, 1966. Burnett, 368 F. Supp at 1154 n.1. The Executive Order approving
the-Montreal Agreement can be found in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
21. See, e.g., Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
22. When the state law is in direct conflict with the Warsaw Convention, the treaty
must prevail under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. VI. See Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1273. When the cause of action is based on state law and
the Convention does not provide a cause ofaction, then the "plaintiff plainly may institute"
a suit without a problem of preemption. Id. at 1273. (citing Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co.,
739 F.2d 130, 134 (3rd Cir. 1984) (the occurrence which caused the injury was not an "acci-
dent" within the meaning of Article 17)). The court in Lockerbie explicitly stated that these
two aspects were not at issue in the case before it; the court was only concerned with
"whether state causes of action are preempted when the state claim alleged falls within the
scope of the Convention." 928 F.2d at 1273. Accordingly, this is the issue addressed by this
Note.
23. Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957).
24. See, e.g., Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
25. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848, 857 n.12 (N.Y. 1974); GEOR-
GETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE WARSAW SYSTEM IN MUNICI-
PAL COURTS 125 (1977).
26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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on the carrier's liability and a cap2" on the amount of recoverable
damages. State statutes, on the other hand, increasingly specify
types of damages a plaintiff may recover.28 To recover those dam-
ages specifically allowed by the state statutes, injured parties, like
the plaintiffs in Lockerbie,2" may wish to base their claims on state
law rather than the Convention."
From a practical standpoint, when the passenger dies in an
aircrash, the $75,000 cap is quickly reached, and the debate over
what types of damages are recoverable becomes moot. Many acci-
dents occur on international flights, however, that do not involve
aircrashes. In these instances, the passenger is likely to suffer only
a minor injury, such as a broken hand or a sprained ankle. For
these types of injuries, the damage cap is less likely to be reached.
Thus, a plaintiff, in order to be fully compensated for his injury,
may seek specific damages under state law, damages that are
neither expressly allowed nor expressly barred by the Conven-
tion.31 Lockerbie precludes all future plaintiffs in the Second Cir-
cuit from seeking such damages because that decision interprets
the Convention as providing the exclusive cause of action, at least
where the passenger suffers a death, wounding, or other bodily in-
jury32 and leaves the issue of damages to be decided by federal
common law of tort.33
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 (McKinney Supp. 1992); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130 (Baldwin 1971); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (Vernon 1988); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-1-1-2 (Burns 1986); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922 (Callaghan 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT
§ 28A-18-2(b) (1991).
29. In Lockerbie, the plaintiffs sought punitive damages, a state statutory remedy avail-
able in cases of wilful misconduct. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Lockerbie, 928 F.2d
1267 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 91-259). See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3(b) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1992).
30. The plaintiff may also desire to try his case in a state court rather than in a federal
forum.
31. For example, a plaintiff may seek to recover damages for negligent infliction of
mental distress under state law. If the conditions of Article 17 are met, then the carrier is
presumed liable, and therefore, a plaintiff should be able to recover damages. See Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1494 (1991). One of the conditions is that the passen-
ger must suffer a death, wounding, or other bodily injury. Warsaw Convention, supra note 7,
art. 17. This condition would preclude the recovery of damages in a state law action for
negligent infliction of mental distress where the plaintiff sustained no physical injury. See
Floyd, 111 S. Ct. at 1502.
32. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1278.
33. Id. at 1278-80. After deciding that state law causes of action were preempted by the
Convention, the Lockerbie court considered what law must be applied in deciding claims
before it. Id. at 1279. The court concluded that the federal common law of tort should be
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III. EXCLUSIVITY
Neither the Convention itself nor any congressional act ex-
pressly mandates that the Convention preempts state law claims.34
An understanding of the judicial treatment of the Convention is a
necessary step in an analysis of this issue. In addition, we must
consider the intent of the drafters and the document itself to de-
termine whether the Convention preempts state law causes of
action.
A. Judicial Interpretation of the Warsaw Convention
Until the late 1950s, courts generally held that the Convention
did not create a cause of action; the treaty simply limited the lia-
bility of the air carrier. Thus, a plaintiff had to bring his claim
under some other law, usually state law. This early view is largely
attributable to two Second Circuit decisions:35 Komlos v. Compa-
gnie Nationale Air France;36 and Noel v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana.37 These decisions were sharply criticized by commen-
tators who felt the requirement of an independent cause of action
would needlessly hamper claims under the Convention. 8
Eventually, the Second Circuit, reversed itself in Benjamins v.
British European Airways,39 finding that the treaty did create a
cause of action.40 Plaintiffs were no longer required to find an inde-
pendent basis for their suit. The Benjamins court reasoned that
the goal of uniformity could "better be achieved by making federal
applied to determine such issues as what are the elements for a given cause of action and
what kinds of damages are recoverable. Id.
34. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1273.
35. "The Second Circuit had spoken twice, the Supreme Court had denied certiorari,
and in all subsequent American Warsaw cases it was either assumed or decided that the
claim must be founded on some law other than the Convention itself." Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, supra note 12, at 519.
36. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954). The Second Circuit reversed the district court deci-
sion, but did not disturb the lower court's determination that the Convention did not create
a cause of action. See 209 F.2d 437-40.
37. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
38. See G. Nathan Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 323, 333 (1959) ("the language in the [Komlos and Noel] cases is dangerous");
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 518 ("[i]f the Noel case stood .. .the alleged
simplicity of bringing a Warsaw Claim had disappeared").
39. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
40. 572 F.2d at 919.
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as well as state courts accessible to Convention litigation. '41 To-
day, the conclusion in Benjamins is universally accepted.
2
B. Debate over Whether the Warsaw Convention Provides
the Exclusive Cause of Action
After recognizing that a plaintiff could choose between causes
of action based on either the treaty or state law, the Second43 and
Fifth 4 Circuit Courts of Appeal have closed the door on state
claims by interpreting the treaty as providing the exclusive cause
of action.
In Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American
World Airlines, Inc.,45 the plaintiff brought two claims against Pan
Am, one based on the Warsaw Convention, and another based on
state negligence law, to recover for damaged cargo.46 The district
court for the Southern District of Texas found the defendant liable
on both claims and awarded attorney's fees as provided by Texas
law. 7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit considered "whether the Convention provides the exclusive
liability remedy for international air carriers by providing an inde-
pendent cause of action, thereby preempting state law, or whether
it merely limits the amount of recovery for a cause of action other-
wise provided by state or federal law."'48 The court's framing of the
issue is flawed because it presumes that if the Convention created
an independent cause of action, then that cause of action pre-
empted all others.
The Boehringer court summarily explained that, "In examin-
ing the minutes and documents from the meetings resulting in the
Convention, we find the delegates were concerned with creating a
uniform law to govern air crashes, dehors national law."4 From the
statement of Sir Alfred Dennis, the British delegate to the Conven-
tion, that Article 24 "'excludes recourse to common law' for a
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airlines,
Inc., 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1186 (1985); In re Mexico City
Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 412 (9th Cir. 1983).
43. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1273.
44. Boehringer, 737 F.2d at 459.
45. 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1186 (1985).
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cause of action," 50 the court reasoned that the treaty created an
independent cause of action, and hence, a "controlling cause of ac-
tion."'" The logic of the Boehringer court is muddled and can only
be followed if one accepts that court's framing of the issue.
The Boehringer court then addressed whether the Convention
preempted state law. Acknowledging that Congress had not ex-
pressly preempted state law in this area,52 the court considered
whether Congress intended the Convention to "regulate [the] sub-
ject [of air carrier liability] so pervasively that [the Convention]
completely occupies the field" thereby implicitly preempting state
law."3 Without explaining why it viewed the Warsaw Convention as
regulatory, or how the Convention pervasively occupied the field,
the court concluded that Congress had non-expressly preempted
the field."' The Boehringer court ruled that the Warsaw Conven-
tion preempted state law causes of action and reversed the trial
court's award of attorney's fees. 5 Other courts have recognized the
Convention's preemption of state law only in very narrow contexts.
In In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979,56 the heirs and
personal representatives of airline employees who had died in a
plane crash, brought claims under the Warsaw Convention against
the airline.5 7 The trial judge dismissed their actions, ruling that
employees killed on the job were limited to the exclusive remedies
provided by the California workers' compensation statutes.5 8 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit followed Benjamins in recognizing that
the Warsaw Convention provides an independent cause of action
for wrongful death .5  The Ninth Circuit held that the Warsaw
Convention preempted the California statute only to the extent
that the workers' compensation statute attempted to create an ex-
clusive remedy for the death of an employee.6 0 This court, unlike
the Boehringer court,61 limited the preemption to that portion of






56. 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
57. See id. at 402-04.
58. Id. at 404. The flight originated in Los Angeles, California. Id. at 403. Additionally,
Los Angeles was the principle place of business for the defendant, Western Airlines. Id. at
404 n.4.
59. Id. at 411-12.
60. Id. at 418.
61. In Boehringer, the Firth Circuit concluded that the Convention implicitly pre-
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California law which was in direct conflict with the Convention.
The debate over exclusivity is perhaps nowhere more sharply
focused than it is in the southern district of Florida. In Rhymes v.
Arrow Air, Inc.,2 the district court held that the Warsaw Conven-
tion does not provide the exclusive cause of action, but it does pro-
vide the exclusive remedy, thereby preempting any "portion of the
state remedy that is in conflict [with the Convention]."6
After the Rhymes decision, three other cases in the southern
district of Florida addressed the same question. The district court
in Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia"' accepted the
analysis of Rhymes, while the court in Velasquez v. Aerovias Na-
cionales de Colombia rejected Rhymes, reaching the opposite con-
clusion.6 5 In Alvarez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia,"6 the
district court considered the analyses of both Rhymes and Velas-
quez. After finding the Velasquez analysis inadequate, 7 the Alva-
rez court reached the same conclusion as Rhymes, that the Con-
vention provided the exclusive remedy, not the exclusive cause of
action.6 8 Calderon, Velasquez, and Alvarez all arose from the same
aircrash, the January 25, 1990 crash of Avianca Flight 52.89 All
three cases involved suits removed from state court to federal
court on the 'grounds that the Convention provided the exclusive
cause of action,"° and in all three cases, the plaintiffs moved to
remand the cases back to state court. The motions to remand re-
ceived disparate results,7 1 which highlights the need for the resolu-
tion of the exclusivity issue.
empted all Texas law in the field of air carrier liability. See supra notes 52-54 and accompa-
nying text.
62. 636 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
63. Id. at 741.
64. 738 F. Supp. 485, 486-87 (S.D. Fla. 1990), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
929 F.2d 599 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 376 (1991).
65. 747 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
66. 756 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
67. Id. at 555 ("Velasquez did not discuss the 'however founded' language from Article
24(1), except in a footnote .... .
68. Id.
69. Calderon, 738 F.. Supp. at 486; Velasquez, 747 F. Supp. at 671; Alvarez, 756 F.
Supp. at 551.
70. Calderon, 738 F. Supp. at 486; Velasquez, 747 F. Supp. at 671; Alvarez, 756 F.
Supp. at 551.
71. Calderon, 738 F. Supp. at 487 (motion to remand back to state court granted); Ve-
lasquez, 747 F. Supp. at 679 (motion to remand denied); Alvarez, 756 F. Supp. at 556 (mo-
tion to remand granted).
502 [Vol. 23:2
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IV. IN RE AIR DISASTER AT LOCKERBIE, SCOTLAND: THE DECISION
The Lockerbie court began its analysis by noting that while
Benjamins clearly held that the Warsaw Convention does provide
a cause of action, it left open the question as to whether state law
claims are still available under the treaty.2 The court acknowl-
edged that neither the treaty itself nor any act of Congress ex-
pressly addresses the preemption issues."
Trying to avoid ruling on an issue not properly before it, the
Lockerbie court stated that it was only deciding whether a state
law cause of action is preempted when a cause of action is availa-
ble to the plaintiff under the Warsaw Convention itself.7 4 In its
analysis, the court relied on both the Boehringer and Mexico City
Aircrash opinions.7 It also relied heavily on the subsequent ac-
tions of other signatory nations to the Convention. 76 "England, Ca-
nada, and Australia have all enacted implementing statutes that
make an Article 17 action the exclusive remedy for claims governed
by the Convention. 7 7 "The way the other parties have viewed the
Convention, its emphasis on uniformity, and the need for a single,
unified rule on such points as . . . punitive damages lead [the
Lockerbie court to believe] that the Convention should be inter-
preted as making all actions-other than those not based on the
Convention-exclusive under it."" s The Lockerbie court feared
that the existence of state law causes of action would result in "a
72. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1273. Whether the Benjamins court left that question open
or not is arguable. That court said that the goal of uniformity could "better be achieved by
making federal as well as state courts accessible to Convention litigation." Benjamins, 572
F.2d at 919. One way to interpret this language is that the Benjamins court intended con-
tinued recognition of state law causes of action. Alternatively, if the court intended that all
future actions be based on the Convention, state courts would still be available to the plain-
tiffs. This interpretation of the above quote is also logical, but given that courts had spent
more than two decades believing the Convention did not provide a cause of action, it is
unlikely that the Benjamins court would have eliminated state law causes without any dis-
cussion of the point. Hence, the better interpretation of the language is that the Benjamins
court envisioned the continued recognition of state law actions.
73. 928 F.2d at 1273.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1273-74.
76. Id. at 1274.
77. Id. See Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36, § 1(4) (Eng.); Carriage by
Air Act, R.S.C., ch. C-26 § 2(5) (1985) (Can.); Civil Aviation (Carrier's Liability) Act, 1959-
1973, § 12(2), 2 AusTL. AcTs P. 643, 645 (1974) (Austl.). The Carriage by Air Act of 1932 was
repealed in 1961 when the United Kingdom enacted a new Act. See Carriage by Air Act,
1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 27 § 3 (Eng.); MILLER, supra note 25, at 229.
78. 928 F.2d at 1274.
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trial court [being] forced to apply differing law from several states
to various plaintiffs,"79 making the application of the Warsaw Con-
vention "even more complex"80 and resulting in "inconsistent ap-
plication of law to the same accident. ' 81 The court concluded that
the Convention preempts state law on the principle that national
interests create such a need for uniformity that to allow state regu-
lation "would create potential frustration of national purposes. "82
V. ANALYSIS
The cases cited by the Lockerbie court actually add little sup-
port for its decision. The court, itself, concedes that the Boehr-
inger opinion is not an "in-depth analysis, ' 83 thus, any reliance
placed on that decision can add only minimum support.
The Lockerbie court relies on footnote twenty-five of the Mex-
ico City Aircrash case when it states, "The Ninth Circuit has also
rebutted the idea that a cause of action may be founded on some
law other than the Convention."" The point of the Mexico City
Aircrash footnote, however, is that "the delegates did not intend
. . . the cause of action created by the Convention to be exclu-
sive."8 5 Footnote twenty-five is very lengthy, and the Lockerbie
court seems to have taken a portion of the footnote out of context
79. Id. at 1275.
80. Id.
81. 928 F.2d at 1276. The court was motivated by its belief that the choice of law
problems associated with recognizing state law causes of action would consume scarce judi-
cial resources. See id.
The court's decision, however, will not result in the elimination of inconsistent applica-
tion of the law to the same accident. The definition of "international travel" can lead to the
application of the Warsaw Convention in purely domestic flights, where it is normally inap-
plicable. For example, if an international traveler is on board a domestic flight that crashes,
then all other passengers will sue outside the Convention, but the international traveler's
-recovery will be limited by the Convention, thus resulting in absurd consequences. See, e.g.,
Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982) (domestic flight from New
Orleans to New York).
82. 928 F.2d at 1275 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
244 (1959)).
83. 928 F.2d at 1273 ("without [an] in-depth analysis, [that] court ruled that Texas law
was preempted").
84. Id. at 1274.
85. In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 414 n.25 (9th Cir.
1983). Mexico City Aircrash was factually unique in that a state compensation law pur-
ported to establish the exclusive remedy for the death of an employee, thus attempting to
preempt the Warsaw Convention. The Ninth Circuit held that the state law was preempted
only to the extent that the law attempted to limit the recovery allowed by the Convention.
Id. at 418.
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to support a proposition for which the case does not stand.
A. The Warsaw Convention
Absent from Lockerbie's analysis of the preemption issue is a
detailed discussion of the Convention itself. As the United States
Supreme Court has said, we must "begin ... with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used." 6 A
review of the history and an analysis of the Convention itself sug-
gest that the Warsaw Convention was not intended to provide the
exclusive cause of action.
In the 1920s, the airline industry faced many uncertainties in
dealing with the legal systems of the many countries that it ser-
viced. The drafters of the Convention set out to reduce these un-
certainties by establishing a liability system that would apply to all
international flights.8 7 The two basic goals of the Convention were:
(1) "to establish uniformity as to documentation such as tickets
and waybills, and procedures for dealing with claims arising out of
international transportation"; and (2) "to limit the potential liabil-
ity of air carriers in the event of accidents and lost or damaged
cargo."'88 The establishment of such a liability system was essential
to promote the fledgling airline industry. 9
Although the drafters did intend the Convention to govern the
liability of air carriers in all cases to which it was applicable,9" the
drafters did not intend to dictate all aspects of resulting law suits.
For example, Article 22 allows the issue of "periodical payments"
to be decided by "the law of the court to which the case is submit-
ted."9 Article 25 provides that the Convention's limit on liability
would not apply if damages caused by "such default . . . as, in
accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submit-
ted, is considered to-be equivalent to wilful misconduct."92 Articles
28 and 29 provide that questions of procedure and formulas for
86. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
87. Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. I ("shall apply to all international
transportation").
88. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1467 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991) (citing WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 37, 85, 87).
89. See WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 13 ("Common rules to regulate interna-
tional air carriage have become a necessity.").
90. Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 17.
91. Id. art. 22.
92. Id. art. 25.
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calculating the period of limitation, respectively, shall be governed
by "the law of the court to which the case is submitted.""3 Articles
21 and 24(2) make similar references. 4 The Convention's accept-
ance of local law in these examples is evidence that the drafters
were not absolutely opposed to the application of common law in
Warsaw Convention cases.
At trial, questions arise that are not specifically addressed by
the Convention. What law determines the elements for a given
cause of action, and what law determines who may recover in the
event of a passenger's death are common examples. A court that
hears a Warsaw Convention case must nonetheless decide these is-
sues. Where the drafters failed to address such issues, and where
the Convention expressly provides for the application of local law
in some areas but nowhere expressly precludes its application in
others, local law is the logical choice to answer these unaddressed
questions. 5 This view is consistent with the terms of the treaty
which readily endorse application of local law.96
The language of the Convention itself suggests that it did not
intend to provide the exclusive cause of action. Article 2411 sug-
gests that any action, "however founded," must be brought subject
to the conditions and limitations of the treaty. Sir Alfred Dennis, a
British delegate to the Convention, believed that the "however
93. Id. arts. 28, 29.
94. Id. arts. 21, 24 (Article 21 refers to contributory negligence, while Article 24 con-
cerns who may file suit under the Convention).
95. See Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 858 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965) ("[iut seems clear that the Warsaw Convention left this issue, as it
did other[s], . . . to the internal law of the parties to the Convention")-
The Latin maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, might suggest the Convention
intended to endorse local law only in those areas expressly stated and therefore, local law
should not be used to determine any other issues. This conclusion, however, ignores that
certain issues, such as damages, are not addressed by the Convention. The court hearing the
case must nonetheless decide these issues. The Latin maxim is supposed to assist one in
interpreting an instrument, but its application here would be unwise because it would leave
issues undecided.
96. See supra, notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
97. The complete text of Article 24 is as follows:
(1) In the cases covered by [Alrticles 18 and 19 [damage to goods and delay in
transportation,] any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought
subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention. (2) In the cases
covered by Article 17 [death and bodily injury] the provisions of the preceding
paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are
the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective
rights.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 24 (emphasis added).
506 [Vol. 23:2
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founded" language of Article 24 "touches the very substance of the
Convention, because this excludes recourse to common law."98
Some may believe that Sir Dennis's remark indicates that the Con-
vention was intended to provide the exclusive cause of action, but
his statement must not be read in isolation. At an early stage of
the negotiations on a portion of Article 24 (the portion that even-
tually became Article 25), Sir Dennis also said:
[W]e believe that it is indispensable to specify which law will
decide, whether in such and such case, the carrier is or is not
liable. We propose ... that it be the law of the country where
the contract was concluded .... We believe that this Conven-
tion must leave certain conditions . . . [to] the law which the
contracting parties know the best . . . [and that is] the law of
the country where the contract was concluded."
At a minimum, these comments suggest that Sir Dennis's first
comment should not be given absolute weight. The ultimate text of
the Convention shows that Sir Dennis and the other delegates were
not absolutely opposed to the application of national law.'00 Hence,
a better explanation of the "however founded" language of Article
24 is that the delegates believed the Convention's liability scheme
should govern all causes of action, no matter how founded. The
Ninth Circuit agrees that "[tihe best explanation for the wording
of [A]rticle 24(1) appears to be that the delegates did not intend
that the cause of action created by the Convention to be exclusive.
For example, in the United States, state law causes of action may
be invoked by plaintiffs injured during international air
transportation."°'
B. The Warsaw Convention Provides the Exclusive Remedy
While the Convention does not provide the exclusive cause of
action, it does condition and limit the liability of the international
air carrier in those cases where it is applicable. 1'0 Thus, regardless
98. WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 213.
99. Id. at 64.
100. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
101. In re Mexico City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 414 n.25 (9th Cir. 1983).
102. Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 134 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470
U.S. 1059 (1985); Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 737, 740 (S.D. Fla. 1986). The
Convention does not apply to all international transportation cases. See WARSAW MINUTES,
supra note 12, at 84-86. Article 25 provides that in the case of "wilful misconduct," the
Convention's limitation on liability will not be available to the carrier, and the law of the
court to which the case is submitted will determine whether the conduct is deemed inten-
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of the basis for the cause of action, no liability will attach unless
the three conditions'" a are satisfied, and in no event will the recov-
ery under the Convention exceed $75,000.
Some courts have expressed this same view by drawing a dis-
tinction between an exclusive remedy and an exclusive cause of ac-
tion. In Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc.,104 the district court for the
Southern District of Florida held that the Convention does not
provide the exclusive cause of action, but does provide the exclu-
sive remedy.1 05 The Rhymes court was able to achieve the Conven-
tion's dual goals of limiting the liability of the air carrier and cre-
ating uniformity in handling claims that arise out of international
air transportation. Allowing the plaintiff to state a cause of action
based solely on state law permits the plaintiff to pursue the action
in state court and precludes the defendant from removing it to fed-
eral court.10 Elimination of the state law cause of action is not
necessary to achieve the goals of the Convention because Article 17
ensures uniformity by restricting the carrier's liability to those
cases where its three conditions are satisfied, while Article 22
places an absolute cap on damages.
tional. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 25. The delegates well understood that
where the Convention was inapplicable, the law of the nation would apply. Mr. Pittard, the
Switzerland delegate, emphasized the point when he asked: "Has the scope of this article
been well understood in the sense that if one does not apply the Convention in these cases,
one will apply the common law?" Mr. Ripert, of France, expressed the understanding of all
when he replied: "Naturally!" WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 85-86.
At another point, Mr. DeVos, the reporter for the Convention, announced a proposal of
the Czechoslovak delegate for an additional article which provided: "In the absence of provi-
sions in the present Convention, the provisions of laws and national rules relative to carriage
in each State shall apply." WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 176. Mr. DeVos responded:
"I want to remark that this was provided for . . . I believe therefore, that this provision
would be of no use." Id. These comments by the delegates show that not only did they
believe that the Convention would not apply to all cases, they also well understood that in
such cases, local law would govern.
103. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
104. 636 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
105. Id. at 740-41.
106. Id. at 741. "The mere pleading of a federal statute or treaty as a defense will not
be enough to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal if a federal cause of action does
not appear on the face of the well pleaded complaint." Id. (citing Franchise Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)). In Rhymes, the plaintiff stated
his cause of action solely on state law, and the defendant removed the case to federal court.
The plaintiff petitioned to remand his case to the state court on the grounds that the de-
fendant had improperly removed the action. The federal court granted the plaintiff's motion
for remand, recognizing that if removal were allowed "whenever a federal defense is raised
to a state cause of action, the dockets of the federal bench would become inundated with a
flood of state litigation." Id. at 742.
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That the Convention should condition and limit liability for
any cause of action is also consistent with the decisions of the
French courts, which have held that the liability limitations of the
Convention are exclusive and that a plaintiff cannot circumvent
those limits by renouncing contractual rights and suing under a
negligence theory." 7
C. The Warsaw Convention Preempts State Laws to the Ex-
tent They Conflict with the Convention's Remedies
Of course, if the Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive
remedy, then, as a treaty of the United States, it must preempt
inconsistent state law remedies. For example, if the Warsaw Con-
vention precludes the award of punitive damages, as indeed many
courts have concluded,' then a state law providing for punitive
damages would be preempted to the extent it attempted to inter-
fere with the treaty's exclusivity of remedies. 09 Many courts sup-
port this view of preemption. 1 0
The preemption theory applied by the Lockerbie court is one
of implied preemption whereby Congressional intent to preempt
state law is inferred from a scheme of federal regulation whose
107. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 237..
108. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1284-87; Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462,
1483-85 (1989), reversed on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991)' This Note does not con-
sider the Lockerbie court's analysis of the punitive damages issue.
109. This would be true at least to the point that the state law attempted to punish the
defendant. Most courts that have considered it have found that the Warsaw Convention is
entirely compensatory in tone and structure. See Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1483-85; Lockerbie, 928
F.2d at 1280-87; In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, 684 F. Supp. 927, 931
(W.D. Ky. 1987). Some states, however, view punitive damages as purely compensatory,
while other states view them as part penal and part compensatory. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at
1270. To the extent that these damages are compensatory, they would not be in conflict with
the Convention.
110. See, e.g., Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1480 ("Convention preempts any state law which is
inconsistent with it"); Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d at 418 ("preempts the exclusivity of
the California . . . statute . . . [because it] purported to limit the recovery allowed by the
Convention"); Rhymes, 636 F. Supp at 741 ("Convention will preempt the portion of the
state remedy that is in conflict"); Alvarez, 756 F. Supp. at 556 ("Convention's exclusive
remedy may indeed serve to preempt inconsistent and contradictory provisions of the plain-
tiff's state law theory"). But see Boehringer 737 F.2d at 459 ("preempts [all of] state law in
the areas covered"); Stanford v. Kuwait Airlines Corp., 705 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) ("Convention exclusively govern[s] the rights and liabilities of the parties"); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 844-45 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983), reh'g denied, 464
U.S. 978 (1983) ("Convention specifically controls and exclusively governs any and all
claims").
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"subject matter demands uniformity vital to national interests."",
The Lockerbie court inferred a Congressional "preference for uni-
form, international rules" from the Senate's approval of the War-
saw Convention." 2 The court believed that "[t]he existence of dif-
fering laws in various states . . . would frustrate the Convention's
aims of uniformity and certainty in the application of those inter-
national rules."" 3 Perceiving a "potential frustration of national
purposes,""" the court concluded that the Convention impliedly
preempted state law causes of action.
The application of the implied preemption theory is not rea-
sonable in this case. Congressional intent to supersede state law
may be inferred when the subject matter "demand[s] exclusive
federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to national
interests.""' The question is whether uniformity in regulating the
liability of the international air carrier is vital to national interests,
and if so, whether regulating the liability of international air carri-
ers "demands exclusive federal regulation" in order to achieve this
uniformity.
Certainly, there are strong national interests in the promotion
and maintenance of an international transportation system, but do
these interests require complete uniformity in the regulation of air
carrier liability? The Convention itself goes a long way toward en-
suring uniformity in Warsaw Convention cases, as no carrier will
be liable unless the terms and conditions are satisfied."' In addi-
tion, the Convention places an absolute cap on the liability of the
carrier. " 7 Were it not for the cap on damages and the conditions
for liability, then complete uniformity might be needed to promote
"national interests."
The drafters of the Convention did not appear to demand
complete uniformity in the regulation of air carrier liability. The
111. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1275.
112. Id. at 1278. The Warsaw Convention is a treaty that was actually drafted by other
nations, as the United States was not a participant. See WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at
5-10 (listing the countries represented and their delegates). The Convention attempted to
limit the liability of air carriers in order to promote what was then a fledgling industry of
international air transportation.
113. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1278.
114. Id. at 1275 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959)).
115. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963).
116. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Convention attempts to limit the liability of air carriers for certain
injuries118 arising out of certain accidents."9a It expressly provides
for the application of local law to determine certain legal issues120
while failing to address many others.12' If by its own terms it read-
ily endorses local law, then one cannot reasonably conclude that
complete uniformity was the intent of the drafters.
Furthermore, regulating the liability of international air carri-
ers does not "demand exclusive federal regulation" in order to
achieve uniformity. As described above, the treaty itself provides a
strong basis for uniformity by dictating the conditions under which
a carrier will be liable and placing an absolute cap on damages.
Since the treaty was ratified in 1934,122 these conditions and limi-
tations have resulted in the development of an extensive interna-
tional transportation system. In light of how well the national in-
terests have been served, it is not reasonable to conclude that the
regulating the liability of international air carriers "demands ex-
clusive federal regulation" in order to promote "national
interests."
Inferring a Congressional intent to preempt state laws is espe-
cially suspect when the Senate's ratification of the treaty is com-
pared with the actions of other signatory countries. "England, Ca-
nada, and Australia have all enacted implementing statutes that
make an Article 17 action the exclusive remedy for claims governed
by the Convention. ' 12 3 Those three countries participated in the
Warsaw Convention, while the United States did not.12 4 England,
Canada, and Australia took additional legislative action on the
subject by enacting "enabling" statutes, while the United States
did not. The two responses to the Convention suggest that Con-
gress viewed the treaty differently because they chose not to enact
enabling statutes to make the Convention the exclusive cause of
action. In addition, Congress had a golden opportunity to reshape
118. Warsaw Convention, supra note 7, art. 17 (death, wounding, or other bodily
injury).
119. Id. (accident must occur on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking or
disembarking the flight).
120. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
122. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. at 1493.
123. 928 F.2d at 1274. The Lockerbie court found particular significance in the fact that
"Australia and Canada, the two nations whose law is closest to our own, have applied a
single substantive law to actions under the Convention." Id. Their "enabling" statutes, how-
ever, explain why they have applied "a single substantive law" to such actions.
124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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the liability of the international air carrier when the United States
denounced the Convention in 1965,'125 but instead, it withdrew its
denunciation after the international air carriers agreed to a higher
liability limit. The responses of Congress suggest that the Lock-
erbie court's application of implicit preemption is unreasonable.
The proper theory of preemption is that which is based on the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The treaty
should preempt only those contradictory state laws to the extent
that they are inconsistent with the treaty. 126 State law claims, how-
ever, may not necessarily conflict with the limitations and condi-
tions of the Convention and, therefore, should not be preempted.
Application of the Supremacy Clause as a theory of preemption is




Lockerbie presents the controversial issue of whether the War-
saw Convention provides the exclusive cause of action available to
a passenger who has been injured during an international flight.
The decision reveals a split in the federal courts, a split that is
unlikely to be resolved soon since the Supreme Court has recently
declined to review the Lockerbie decision.'1
8
Although uniformity is an important concern of the Conven-
tion, Lockerbie carries this goal beyond that which was envisioned
by its drafters. The Convention's dual goals of uniformity and lim-
itation of air carriers' liability are best achieved by allowing the
plaintiff to bring a claim based either on the treaty or on state law,
yet limiting his recovery according to the terms and conditions of
the Warsaw Convention. Thus, the Convention should not provide
the exclusive cause of action, but it should control the available
remedies. This view is consistent with the language of the Conven-
125. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
126. "[Wlhere Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area,
state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983)
(emphasis added). Here the "federal law" is a treaty, and thus the treaty must prevail as the
supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
127. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
128. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, sub nom. Rein v. Pan American World
Airways Inc., 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991). The Supreme Court has also declined to address the
issue on two other occasions. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1502 (1991);
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 408 (1985).
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tion, the intentions of the signatory countries, and judicial prece-
dent within the United States.
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